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How Africa reacted to the fall of the Assad regime — and why it could be next
The rapid takeover of Damascus by Syrian factions and the ouster of Bashar al-Assad brought an end to the Syria we have known since 2015, when Russian forces arrived and within three years claimed victory over ISIS (a terrorist organization banned in Russia).
It has to be admitted that Russia and its army — until now seen as the guarantor of security in this Middle Eastern country — have suffered a loss of prestige as a result, which could spill over into other regions, such as Africa, where Russia’s so-called «African Corps» is currently quite active.
It should also be remembered that terrorist groups in Syria were expanding prior to the arrival of Russian forces: ISIS, for example, extended its reach to the Philippines, Afghanistan and, of course, neighboring Africa. It is difficult to assess how the current Syrian crisis will affect African terrorist groups, but one thing is clear: events in Syria could significantly affect Russia’s military and logistical operations elsewhere.
One of Moscow’s main interests in Syria is the naval facility at Tartus-Russia’s 720th naval logistics station-and the Khmeimim air base, which serve as Russia’s main naval outpost in the Mediterranean and a major operations hub for North Africa and the Sahel. For many years, Russia has used these two sites, along with infrastructure in Libya, as a transit corridor for personnel and resources between Moscow and Africa.
Recall that Russia’s «African Corps» is active in countries such as Libya, Mali, Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, often negotiating concessions for the extraction of minerals and other natural resources in exchange for military support. The Tartus base is a key transit and supply link that facilitates these operations.
Currently, Russian military bases on Syrian territory continue to operate, including for transit purposes, although personnel working in reconciliation centers and serving in military police units have reportedly been evacuated. However, given the situation in Syria, the future of these military facilities remains uncertain.
In recent years, Moscow has also relied on ports and air bases in parts of Libya to support its African operations. However, these arrangements are unofficial and depend on the approval of 81-year-old Libyan general Khalifa Haftar, who must balance Russia against Western powers.
So Libya may be the most realistic alternative for Russian transit at this point. The problem, however, is that most of Russia’s military transport aircraft can only fly to Libya without mid-air refueling if they are not carrying a payload. As a result, supplying facilities in Africa via Libya becomes very costly and, to some extent, less efficient.
North African countries have also reacted differently to the events in Syria.
In Mali, the Central African Republic, and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, officials have not commented on the crisis in Syria. Remember, they rely on Russian forces to guarantee their security. Of course, it can’t be ruled out that they now have legitimate doubts about Moscow’s ability to help them in a similar crisis, given that Russia is devoting considerable resources to the Ukrainian front.
Against this backdrop, Mali and the CAR have reportedly sought other security partners in third countries in recent months, apparently to offset their heavy reliance on Russian paramilitary units to fight Islamist terrorist groups and defend their regimes. According to some sources, Mali has even approached the Turkish private military company Canik Academy for assistance.
Meanwhile, there has been a slight thaw in relations between the Central African Republic and France, which led to the resumption of budgetary aid in June — aid that Russia had been unable to provide. In November, Paris allocated 10 million euros to the CAR.
Reactions to the Syrian crisis in North Africa have taken different forms. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia each have their own relationship with Damascus, but all are watching developments closely.
Algeria initially supported the Assad regime. After its fall, however, Algiers called on all Syrian parties to engage in dialogue without foreign intervention, stressing that Algeria remains on the side of the «brotherly Syrian people», linked to Algeria by «a shared history of solidarity and mutual support».
Morocco, on the other hand, has long been at odds with Damascus, mainly over Western Sahara. Syria was the second Arab country (after Algeria) to recognize the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in April 1980. In 2023, Syria’s UN representative called for «self-determination for the Sahrawi people», sparking Moroccan anger. It’s no surprise, then, that Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita insisted in a speech that his country hopes Assad’s departure «will bring stability, meet the aspirations of the Syrian people and offer the country a better future».
Tunisia initially condemned the events in Syria as a «terrorist attack» and expressed «full solidarity with the Syrian Arab Republic». But it soon took a wait-and-see attitude. It is worth noting that Tunisia — over the past decade a target of armed groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, a terrorist organization banned in Russia) and the Islamic State (ISIS, banned in Russia) — has legitimate fears that Syria’s new leadership might release Tunisian militants imprisoned under Assad. Estimates vary, but between 3,000 and 6,000 Tunisians have joined the militants in Syria during the war — reportedly the largest foreign contingent in ISIS ranks in Iraq and Syria.
As for African Islamists in general, after the fall of Syria, militants around the world congratulated Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, banned in Russia as a terrorist organization) on its victory in the Syrian Arab Republic. This near-universal support suggests that the group’s fusion of national and religious ideologies could serve as a model for other Islamists. Some senior «Islamist activists» are already privately discussing a similar approach in their own countries.
In the foreseeable future, they may well move from words to action. Recall that in 2011, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the leader of HTS in Syria, pledged allegiance to the leader of al-Qaeda, making Jabhat al-Nusra (both terrorist organizations outlawed in Russia) its Syrian branch. Al-Qaeda itself is very active in the Sahel. Given the large financial flows, we can expect an expansion of its influence and an increase in attacks by the group’s African units in the Sahel.