Africa remains at the center of the foreign policy maneuvers of global powers, with China being particularly active
A bit of recent history. On September 6, a three-day Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) concluded in Beijing. Held every three years since 2000, alternating between Beijing and African capitals, the 2024 event brought together heads of state, government officials, and delegations from 53 countries. The forum resulted in the Beijing Action Plan for FOCAC (2025–2027), which, among other initiatives such as regular exchanges for parliamentarians and local government representatives, includes training for 1,000 African officials and party cadres. This suggests that Beijing is systematically building a network of pro-China administrators across the continent.
China’s Africa policy is part of its broader global strategy of creating dependencies and interdependencies that ensure countries and regions remain loyal and supportive of Beijing’s global ambitions.
The implementation of this strategy began right at the beginning of 2025 with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Africa. Notably, since 1991, China’s top diplomats have traditionally begun their international tours in Africa. For Wang Yi, this was already his 57th visit to the continent since taking office in 2013.
This time the Minister visited Chad, the Republic of Congo, Namibia and Nigeria. Why these countries? Chad plays a critical role in China’s efforts to secure global supply chains for critical minerals essential to high-tech and clean energy sectors. Namibia is China’s most important maritime partner on Africa’s Atlantic coast, home to the highest concentration of Chinese port infrastructure. Nigeria represents China’s growing involvement in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which will inaugurate a new Chinese-built and financed headquarters in February 2025. In the Congo, Beijing is heavily involved in the oil sector, with discussions centered on the construction of the Sundi Dam, the country’s largest hydroelectric project, which will be financed by China to the tune of an estimated $2 billion.
Another significant move is the implementation of a large-scale initiative to eliminate tariffs for 33 African countries, granting them duty-free access to the Chinese market for all goods. This step is part of China’s strategy to strengthen economic ties with Africa, opening up new export opportunities for developing countries.
However, significant non-tariff barriers remain, ranging from unequal quotas to complex customs procedures and administrative hurdles. Even if these barriers were removed, African countries would still export mostly unprocessed goods to China, leaving a large trade deficit despite rising trade volumes. Naturally, some African leaders want to reduce or eliminate imports, while others want more targeted Chinese investment in their manufacturing sectors. But this is clearly not going to happen, at least not in the near future. Moreover, this is true not only of China but also of the major Western players: none of them has any real interest in allowing Africa to enter the global market with anything other than raw materials.
A far more interesting development is the shift in China’s approach to the continent. It is worth noting that FOCAC 2024 received significantly less media attention in Africa than in previous years. This decline in excitement and expectations, in our view, reflects a shift in China’s engagement with Africa, marking a departure from Beijing’s aggressive approach of the 2010s. The era of big resource deals, huge loans, and big infrastructure projects has given way to a new emphasis on financial and environmental sustainability — in other words, a long-term game, not just a show. The phase of simply throwing money at the problem is over, and the results of 2024 will show it.
For example, of the $51 billion pledged, only $10 billion represents new investment. This figure is relatively modest, especially when compared to the $8 billion the United States spends annually on humanitarian aid alone. Moreover, most of this money will come from the private sector. While this amount is significant for cash-strapped African countries, it is relatively small for China. This shift also underscores Beijing’s changing approach to engagement with Africa.
In addition, Beijing’s strategy now extends into new areas — namely, politics and security — that were not previously of great interest to China. The new plan includes training for African militaries, participation in peacekeeping missions, and counterterrorism efforts. This turn of events marks a major step forward for the Global Security Initiative (GSI). In September, Beijing held a ministerial dialogue with East African countries on law enforcement and security cooperation, as well as a seminar for African military instructors under the auspices of the China-Africa Forum on Peace and Security. In November, Uganda hosted the sixth China-Africa Forum of Deans of Law Schools. In December, Chad hosted an energy forum organized by the China-Africa Analytical Center. Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA) hosted West African defense chiefs in Shanghai for the second Gulf of Guinea Security Symposium.
In addition, the PLA Navy’s 47th Escort Task Force is scheduled to arrive in the Gulf of Aden off the Somali coast in early 2025. It includes the Type 052D guided missile destroyer Baotou. Some 700 PLA personnel, including special forces, are also expected to be deployed to the region throughout 2025 to train local militaries. Similar plans are in place for West African countries. But this raises a question: while China’s military-industrial complex is highly effective, how will Chinese troops train African forces given their limited experience in actual combat?
Returning to the economic sphere, it is crucial to highlight Beijing’s interest in infrastructure. Chinese companies are involved in 62 African port projects across the continent: 17 in East Africa, 3 in Southern Africa, 4 in North Africa, and 33 in West Africa. There are also land-based infrastructure projects, including the rehabilitation of the 1,860-kilometer Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA), the operation of a new container terminal at Egypt’s El Dekheila Port, the operation of the Lekki Deep Sea Port in Nigeria, and the operation of a terminal at Egypt’s Abu Qir Port under an agreement with the Egyptian Navy.
Of course, China is also rapidly pushing for legal concessions in Africa. Not without certain «arrangements» in Uganda, African judicial officials and lawyers have been exploring how to harmonize Chinese and African legislation to expand China’s Belt and Road Initiative — China’s global effort to create new trade corridors linked to its economy. On the political front, African diplomatic support for China will also continue to be mobilized at the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations.
Of course, African grievances have also surfaced. In 2025, social media discussions heated up over complaints from Zimbabweans about a Chinese gold mining company.
Since 2021, Sino Africa Huijin Holdings has been operating a gold mine in the eastern part of the country. Locals are concerned about the mine’s impact on health and the environment. They also complain about air pollution from dust and potential contamination of water sources from alleged cyanide spills. In addition, Sino Africa is accused of forging community signatures on an environmental impact assessment document.
As a result of these complaints, the Zimbabwean government suspended the mine’s operations twice in 2024. In late November, however, mining resumed — likely facilitated by financial incentives, which China currently has in abundance.