Will this lead to destabilization throughout the South Caucasus?
Against the backdrop of global tectonic events — such as the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, the collapse of the Assad regime, new President Trump’s cowboy statements about buying Greenland, and demands for the return of the Panama Canal — the news from Armenia somehow gets lost. At first glance, these developments do not seem to have a significant impact on the global power reshuffle. However, curious events have recently taken place in Armenia: joint U.S.-Armenian military exercises were held; Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan visited Washington to discuss U.S. assistance in reforming the Armenian army. At the same time, at the CSTO summit in Astana, the issue of Yerevan’s suspended participation in the organization was raised, and President Pashinyan declared that his country’s relations with the CSTO had reached a «point of no return». What is behind all this?
On January 9 this year, Armenia officially started the process of joining the European Union. Interestingly, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Armenia’s membership in the EU could be achieved not by passing certain laws, but by holding a referendum in accordance with the current constitution. In essence, Pashinyan is demonstrating that it is not he alone who is leading the republic into the EU, but rather it is the expression of the people’s will — and the responsibility lies not with him alone, but with the entire nation.
It is worth noting that this is not the first time that Pashinyan has distanced himself from the responsibility of making important decisions, claiming that it is not his choice but the will of the Armenian people. At the same time, however, he forcefully pushes through the measures he deems necessary.
Just five days after announcing the start of the EU accession process, on January 14, 2025, a strategic partnership agreement was signed between the United States and Armenia.
Subsequently, the Armenian government froze the country’s membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and at the recent meeting of the Eurasian Economic Union, Pashinyan participated remotely — and got into a dispute with Alexander Lukashenko, who was chairing the meeting at the time, over his participation in future meetings.
Then events moved even faster: In 2024, Russian border guards withdrew only from Yerevan’s Zvartnots airport, but on January 1, 2025, they handed over control of the Iranian-Armenian border to local border guards. Armenia drifted further and faster away from Russia.
So what does the Strategic Partnership Agreement with the U.S. entail? It has several sections: economic and trade cooperation — with the U.S. supporting Armenia’s integration into the Western economic system; strengthening democracy; defense and security cooperation; and intercultural exchange. In addition, the U.S. has committed to building a new nuclear power plant in Armenia. What remains unclear, however, is the fate of the current Metsamor nuclear power plant, which was built during the Soviet era and is operated by Russia.
As part of the agreement, the U.S. also supported the «Crossroads of Peace» transportation corridor project promoted by the Pashinyan government, which actively opposes the Zangezur corridor promoted by Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Moreover, the U.S. intends to help reform the Armenian army, internal security services, and border guards, but it does not provide Armenia with security guarantees, military assistance, promises to transfer or sell weapons, or commitments to establish U.S. military bases on Armenian territory. In short, there is an outright “NO” on these points. In my view, this situation is becoming extremely dangerous for Armenia. With the loss of Russian support — an important deterrent that could influence Azerbaijan and Turkey — Yerevan is left virtually alone against these two countries.
And here is the main question: could all this lead to Armenia, after leaving the CSTO, joining NATO — thereby having its security guaranteed by the full might of the Western military bloc? It must be admitted that this is an extremely dubious prospect. A striking example is Ukraine’s unsuccessful attempts to seek shelter under the NATO umbrella; after all, it too has long been lured by fleeting promises of joining the ranks of the Atlanticists.
Little Armenia, surrounded on one side by Azerbaijan (with which it did not sign a peace treaty after the last war) and on the other by Turkey — which Armenians historically cannot forgive for the 1915 genocide — and realizing that it has to lean on someone, is trying to deepen its defense ties with the U.S. and several Western countries. Turning away from Russia, Pashinyan is betting on the U.S. and the EU, strengthening ties with France and Greece, and buying weapons from India. Armenia is becoming a U.S. and NATO outpost in the South Caucasus without any guarantees for its own security.
Naturally, this has greatly alarmed all the countries in the region — Turkey, Iran, Russia, and Azerbaijan. Iran, which has excellent allied relations with Armenia and actively supported it even during its conflict with Azerbaijan, is far from happy to have American allies in its neighborhood. I suspect that in this case the Iranians may simply cut off strategic cooperation with Yerevan.
Turkey is extremely nervous about any militarization of Armenia, which it sees as a means of exerting pressure on it. Azerbaijan, with which Yerevan still has an unresolved conflict, is demanding the removal of the words in the Armenian constitution stating that Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Armenia; it also sees Yerevan’s strategic alliance with the White House as preparation for a new war, while it continues to build up its armed forces. Russia, which is being stubbornly pushed out of the South Caucasus, clearly sees this as a violation of its traditional geopolitical interests.
It is clear that the strengthening of ties between the White House and Armenia will lead to even greater chaos and destabilization in this already volatile region and will exacerbate all existing conflicts. Obviously, none of the major players will stand idly by as the geopolitical situation and balance of power in the region shifts. The disruption of this fragile balance could lead to the escalation of a new, even more massive armed conflict.
Under Pashinyan, Armenia has consistently emphasized its willingness to cooperate with both the East and the West and has prepared for a peace treaty with Azerbaijan. However, the strategic partnership agreement with Washington has changed the situation significantly.
The Russian Foreign Ministry immediately declared that Armenia’s attempt to join the EU was incompatible with its simultaneous participation in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Participation in the EAEU brings significant economic benefits to Armenia. Tensions rose after the signing of the Armenia-U.S. Strategic Partnership Agreement, with the other major players — Turkey, Iran, and Russia — expressing concern. Azerbaijan, in particular, is extremely concerned, seeing Armenia’s strengthening partnership with the White House and Brussels as an attempt to prepare for revenge after Yerevan’s defeat in the last Karabakh war.
What could Pashinyan’s attempts to find a new «Big Brother» in place of Russia lead to? Strengthening ties with the United States, France, Greece, and India could have different implications. For Greece, which has a long-standing conflict with Turkey, this appears to be nothing more than an attempt to put pressure on Ankara — a country with which Greece has been at odds for decades over Cyprus and several islands. France has one of the largest and most influential Armenian diasporas, but will Paris be ready to take serious action to defend Armenia if necessary, or will it limit itself to petitions, declarations and conferences? After the French were pulled out of Africa — demonstrating the true «might» of French diplomacy and armed forces — it seems unlikely that one can rely on direct French intervention in the event of a serious conflict in the South Caucasus.
It would be extremely naive and short-sighted to claim that Russia is currently concentrating its efforts on Ukraine and therefore has no interest in the South Caucasus. I would like to remind you that after the 1917 revolution, the international community also believed that Moscow had no business in the South Caucasus — and everyone tried to secure a foothold there by sending troops, from the British to the Turks. But by 1920, Soviet Russia had returned to the South Caucasus, which remained part of the USSR until its collapse.
Moreover, one need not look far for an example. Armenia’s closest neighbor, Georgia, was long on the path to European integration and much closer to the West, but recent elections have shown that Tbilisi has significantly slowed its march toward Europe, preferring pragmatic relations with Russia to EU promises. In fact, the country was one step away from civil war.
I do not rule out the possibility that a sharp turn in Armenia toward Europe and the United States could also lead to social division and serious internal conflict — possibly bringing the country to the brink of civil war, since a significant portion of the Armenian population believes that its future lies in Russia. Moreover, there is a large Armenian diaspora in Russia that is no less numerous or influential than those in the United States or France.
Are Paris or Washington — or even Athens, for that matter — ready to guarantee Yerevan’s security and territorial integrity? Would they, along with the U.S., be ready to solve all of Armenia’s economic problems if relations with Russia took a hard turn? I am convinced that they would not. After all, Armenia’s economy is directly dependent on Moscow — not only for cheap energy supplies, but also for investments (which will amount to $4 billion in 2024 alone) and for the re-export of goods to and from Russia. Does Pashinyan understand that he cannot sit on two chairs and enjoy the benefits of both the EAEU and the EU at the same time? And if Yerevan is forced to abandon economic cooperation with Russia, this will create new problems for the already fragile Armenian economy, leading to further impoverishment, greater social division and unrest. Under these conditions, can Armenia guarantee its security amid the ongoing militarization of Azerbaijan and its less than friendly relations with Turkey?