MONUSCO / Myriam Asmani
The conflict in eastern DRC could be resolved through a “peace in exchange for resources” formula
In 2025, the chairmanship of the regional organization known as the East African Community (EAC) will pass to Kenya, and it appears that President William Ruto intends to use this opportunity to establish his country as the leader of the bloc. A clear example of this is Nairobi’s intervention in the conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
But is Kenya really capable of becoming a regional peacemaker? Will Ruto be able to use his current position in the East African Community — which also includes Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda — to advance his economic interests?
Kenya is undoubtedly one of the pillars of the EAC: it is politically stable, has well-developed infrastructure and international ties, and has repeatedly undertaken peace initiatives at the regional level. In short, Nairobi has every reason to become a leading regional player. Still, one might ask: why should Kenya get involved in the challenges of the turbulent DRC?
The eastern Democratic Republic of Congo is currently experiencing bloody events that could serve as a prologue to a third Congolese war — possibly resulting in the overthrow of President Félix Tshisekedi by M23 rebels. Without delving into the history and details of the conflict, suffice it to say that the M23 is the most notorious of more than a hundred armed groups fighting for control of eastern Congo’s trillions of dollars worth of minerals-resources critical to global technological development. The conflict in the east has already surpassed the country’s internal strife; according to UN experts, some 4,000 Rwandan soldiers are fighting on the side of Kinshasa’s opponents.
Although Kenya’s presence in the DRC, in one form or another, can be traced back to the 1960s, it grew significantly in January 2019 after Félix Tshisekedi became president. In 2021, Presidents Kenyatta and Tshisekedi signed a bilateral agreement stating that further integration between the two countries within the EAC could only be achieved if the peace process in the DRC — particularly in its eastern provinces — was set in motion.
Kenya has experience in «pacifying» regional conflicts in South Sudan and Somalia, which likely contributed to the DRC president’s confidence in Ruto’s abilities. Previously, Kenya also attempted to help stabilize the situation in the DRC, but despite relative success in maintaining a ceasefire and providing humanitarian aid in North Kivu province, a lack of clarity over the mandate of the troops prevented a lasting solution.
Nevertheless, the DRC has chosen Kenya to mediate the conflict. Why? Of the countries in the region, only Kenya and Tanzania have never supported Kinshasa’s opponents in eastern DRC. Moreover, Kenya does not share a border with either Congo or Rwanda, making it a neutral arbiter in that sense. For Nairobi, the issue is one of image and prestige: if successful, Kenya could claim the laurels of being the chief regional diplomat, taking the initiative from Tanzania. In addition, Kenya’s specific commercial interests in the Rwandan-Congolese border region are also pushing it into this mediating role.
When the DRC joined the EAC, Kenya significantly increased its investments in strategic sectors in the DRC, including financial services, aviation, and the oil and energy industries. Kenyan financial institutions have also played a key role in providing loans and investments to Congolese entrepreneurs, helping to establish interregional trade and partnerships. According to the Central Bank of Kenya, Kenyan bank subsidiaries in the DRC accounted for 45.5% of the total pre-tax profits of Kenyan banks in the EAC market-about $229 million in 2023. In addition, a growing number of Kenyans are investing in the DRC’s oil sector, for example by opening service stations to meet local demand.
While these investments bring certain benefits, they also have a negative impact on the DRC, whose industrial production is in dire need of development. The national economy is largely supported by exports from the mining sector. Moreover, many Congolese fear that Kenyan investment could lead to economic hegemony, threatening local investors who cannot effectively compete with Kenyan capital. Indeed, Kenya already dominates the oil sector in eastern DRC, particularly in the supply and fuel distribution chains. The same is true for food, beverages and equipment.
Nevertheless, Kinshasa continues to benefit from its relationship with Nairobi. The alliance offers a chance to restore security in eastern DRC — a region that has been plagued by protracted armed conflict for more than three decades, including ongoing aggression from Rwanda and Uganda involving M23 rebels.
The DRC hopes to use Kenya’s position and authority to influence other EAC member states involved in these conflicts, thereby stabilizing the region. In this case, the DRC would have a chance to secure peace; Kenya, for its part, would protect its investments; and the entire region would open up to new economic opportunities.
However, Kenya’s position in the DRC is not without its drawbacks. First, there is a huge demand for financing and credit — especially in the mining, commercial, and household sectors — but Kenyan banks simply cannot serve everyone. Second, some investors, entrepreneurs, and traders are reluctant to use available banking services because of high fees. Third, banks do not cover the entire country, leaving many Congolese without access to financial services. All of these factors raise legitimate questions about Kenya’s potential and economic prospects in the DRC.
Nevertheless, Nairobi has the capacity to expand its influence in the Congolese economy, even though it currently ranks sixth among the DRC’s main trading partners — behind China, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, Zambia, and Tanzania.
However, there are at least two major negative factors. First, Kenyan investment remains concentrated in a few strategic areas, even though Kenya could expand into sectors such as public infrastructure — roads, hospitals, water systems, and housing. These sectors are the DRC’s top priorities under its 2023–2026 Public Investment Program (PIP). If Kenya wants to make its economic presence more meaningful to the Congolese, it should broaden its initiatives to meet local needs.
Still, no long-term investment can flourish without peace and stability. In 2023, Kenya — eager to help resolve these conflicts — pushed the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF), the EAC’s peacekeeping force, to stop the M23 rebels in North Kivu province. However, the effort failed due to several factors, including poor planning and coordination among troop-contributing states and, most importantly, the DRC government’s ineffective and overconfident stance toward Rwanda and the rebels.
As the leading EAC nation, Kenya has suffered significant reputational damage — especially among the Congolese people whose country it has supported as an ally. This could negatively affect the current relationship between the two states, including their economic ties.
On February 24, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC) appointed the former presidents of Kenya and Nigeria, Uhuru Kenyatta and Olusegun Obasanjo, and the former prime minister of Ethiopia, Hailemariam Desalegn, as mediators to facilitate the peace process in eastern DRC. However, Kinshasa appears to have lost faith in its continental partners, as it appealed to the United States for help just days before the decision.
According to the New York Times, DRC President Félix Tshisekedi has offered the U.S. and European countries a share of his country’s mineral wealth, hoping that the West will pressure Rwanda to help resolve the conflict. According to the newspaper, Tshisekedi claims that the U.S. administration under President Donald Trump has already shown interest in the proposed resource deal. There is some basis for such hope: In 2024, U.S. President Joe Biden declared Kenya a key non-NATO ally of the United States.
Whether Kenya can align its interests with these new conditions as political heavyweights enter the arena remains to be seen.