Time to Turn Towards Damascus

foto

Reuters

A few days ago, interesting news emerged about the possible normalization of relations between Syria and Turkey. Russia has expressed its readiness to act as a mediator in this process.

This seems like a logical solution to the problem we have already identified: establishing relations between Iran and Turkey, the two non-Arab poles of power in the emerging Middle Eastern architecture. We assumed that Syria naturally serves as one of the key platforms for interaction between Tehran and Ankara. Similarly, we assumed that Russia has every reason to claim the role of mediator in this process, based on the experience of the Astana format.

The current situation is indeed conducive to this. The weakening of Israel and the disorientation of the US amid the war in Gaza and the threat of war in Lebanon are shifting Syria out of the focus of Tel Aviv and Washington, providing sufficient freedom for initiative actions on the Syrian front.

When talking about normalization between Syria and Turkey, it’s important to understand that this is a step towards building a new quality of relations between Turkey and Iran. If so, the main obstacle to such normalization was not so much purely Syrian-Turkish problems (the presence of Turkish troops on Syrian territory, refugees, the Kurdish issue, etc.) but the balance of power in Syria between the Turks and Iranians.

Until recently, this balance was completely in favor of Tehran. Financial and economic aid, powerful military support — all this guaranteed Damascus’ critical dependence on Iran. Sharing this dominant position with the Turks (effectively losing it) was clearly not in Iran’s plans.

However, the situation began to change. The turning point was the Al-Aqsa Flood and the subsequent war in Gaza. Syria took a neutral stance, refraining from actively supporting Iran or striking its arch-enemy Israel. Moreover, according to widespread belief, it was Syrian intelligence that guided the Israeli planes that bombed the Iranian consulate in Damascus, killing high-ranking members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Allegedly, this was done to force Tehran to reduce its military and political presence in Syria.

Whether this is true or not is not very important; what matters is that after this incident, Iranian leadership did indeed withdraw some of its representatives from Syria.

Then followed the death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian (who was the architect of Iran’s Middle Eastern strategy). This tragic event put Iranian foreign policy on pause, which continues to this day and will likely last until the formation of the new president’s government.

It’s interesting to recall Damascus’ actions in connection with this catastrophe. It wasn’t President Assad who attended the funeral in Iran but the Syrian Prime Minister. Assad himself visited Tehran later for a meeting and negotiations with Iranian leader Khamenei. It cannot be ruled out that one of the topics discussed was the prospects for normalization between Damascus and Ankara and everything related to it.

It can be assumed that under the new circumstances, Iran will become more receptive to the idea of allowing Turkey into Syria. It appears that establishing a mutually acceptable balance in Syria should be the logical development of the strategic «Development Road» project, which can create a fundamentally new regional economic base. This project was initiated by Turkish President Erdogan and has attracted strong Arab players. Its success largely depends on Tehran’s position, which seems interested in participating. Iranian-Turkish cooperation is essential for success, not only in Iraq but also in Syria.

Thus, it is acceptable to assume that the Iranian leadership gave its agreement in principle to the Syrian-Turkish normalization, after which the relevant statements by Bashar al-Assad, so enthusiastically welcomed in Ankara, were made. It is clear that this process is complex and will require the ability to compromise from all parties.

Compromises will indeed be needed, as problems have already begun. The day after the optimistic statements by Assad and Erdogan, anti-Syrian riots broke out on the Turkish side of the border, and attacks on Turkish soldiers occurred on the Syrian side (reportedly by militants of the armed opposition to Assad created by the Turks). However, these problems seem surmountable with political will.

Ankara demonstrates such will. President Erdogan has declared support for Syria’s territorial integrity (forgetting his own demand for a security zone on the Syrian side of the border) and readiness to restore friendly relations with Assad (thus abandoning the demand to overthrow the «despotic regime»). It is very telling that this turn towards Damascus was supported by the Turkish opposition: one of its prominent leaders expressed readiness to personally go to Damascus to establish direct dialogue with Assad.

It appears that for Turkey, the question of normalization with Syria is now a priority; it is in a hurry, as Iran’s pause should soon end. While Tehran is occupied with its problems, Ankara is accelerating efforts to restore relations with Damascus, seeking mediation from Russia and Iraq.

There is reason to hope that Baghdad, and especially Moscow, will actively engage in this work. For Russia, this is an excellent opportunity to significantly strengthen its position in the region, becoming one of the leading architects and builders of its new structure.

The view from the Kremlin on this structure can be inferred from a curious interpretation of the start of the Syrian war presented in the TV program “Global Majority” on Russia’s Channel One on April 21 of this year. To quote: «The West effectively attacked Syria in 2011 to prevent the threat of creating an alliance of three great Middle Eastern powers: Iran, Turkey, and Syria. If this alliance had formed, the Middle East would have become a powerful player on the world stage a decade ago, completely beyond Western control. Additionally, Syria was Iran’s main ally. By destroying Syria, the collective West weakened Iran, leading to the signing of the ‘nuclear deal’».

We will not revisit the reasons for the start of the Syrian war over a decade ago (the story of the ‘nuclear deal,’ by the way, was also interpreted somewhat differently before). What matters is that today Moscow has outlined the project of a tripartite alliance of Iran, Syria, and Turkey. It is unlikely to be a product of TV journalists’ imagination.