What is driving the rapid rapprochement between these two countries, and what could it lead to?
In just six months, Turkey and Egypt have exchanged high-level visits: Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Cairo in February, and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi visited Ankara in early September.
This rapid Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement, after more than a decade of estrangement, is emerging as a new and highly significant factor in the geopolitics of the Middle East.
It is clear that for Ankara, Egypt is a key priority in shaping Turkey’s strategic depth. Without Egypt’s support, it will be difficult for Turkey to pursue its ambitions in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, particularly in Sudan and Libya. Cairo’s loyalty is also crucial to Turkey’s broader goal of asserting leadership in the Middle East, especially in dealing with Iran, Israel, and the Arab world. In other words, for Turkey, rapprochement with Egypt is part of a larger strategy that deserves its own detailed discussion.
For Egypt, the situation is quite different. For Cairo, partnership with Ankara is the only viable option to address the multitude of geopolitical challenges facing the land of the pyramids.
Indeed, Egypt is surrounded by conflicts, each of which poses a threat to the country’s security: Gaza to the north, Ethiopia and Sudan to the south, and Libya to the west. There are also problems in Yemen and the Red Sea, and rising tensions in the Horn of Africa. Cairo has to deal with each of these situations, but all of them require resources that Egypt simply does not have. The country has only narrowly avoided financial and economic collapse, and thus a major social crisis, by securing billions of dollars in loans from the EU, the IMF, and the Emirates. But this does not change the fundamental problem. These funds won’t help Egypt regain control of its borders. Cairo has lost the ability to solve these problems on its own and desperately needs a strong ally.
We wrote about this back in 2021, suggesting that Israel, rather than Turkey, could become such an ally. But Tel Aviv had no time for Egypt, as it was focused on its confrontation with Iran and complicated relations with the Biden administration. After the events of October 2023, any plans for cooperation with Egypt (outside of Gaza) were rejected. Tel Aviv even refused Egypt’s mediation in negotiations with Hamas…
But as early as 2021, Turkey began moving toward Cairo: Erdoğan sent the first official delegation to Egypt. The following year, the presidents of the two countries shook hands at the World Cup in Qatar, and a year later they met at the G20 summit, after which Erdoğan declared the beginning of a «new era» in bilateral relations.
In February 2024, the Turkish leader arrived in Cairo. At the time, Egypt’s geopolitical situation was rapidly deteriorating: the war in Gaza was approaching Egypt’s border, making it clear that Netanyahu couldn’t be stopped and putting Cairo at risk of direct confrontation with the IDF. Meanwhile, Ethiopia recognized Somaliland’s independence in exchange for the Red Sea port of Berbera, escalating tensions in the Horn of Africa and forcing Egypt to respond.
These two issues (along with Libya and Sudan) were actively discussed by Erdoğan and al-Sisi, with the Egyptian president receiving assurances that Ankara would not leave him isolated. On Gaza, Egypt and Turkey were on the same page, with no significant disagreements.
The key issue was the coordination of positions and actions regarding Somalia. By then, Cairo had already tried to exploit the internal conflict between Ethiopia’s central authorities and the rebellious provinces of Tigray and Oromo, having failed to persuade Addis Ababa to respect Egypt’s interests in the use of the Nile’s waters. But the rebellion was crushed, and it didn’t affect Ethiopia’s determination to complete the Renaissance Dam and secure direct access to the sea.
On January 1, 2024, Addis Ababa signed an agreement with Somaliland granting Ethiopia access to the sea and the establishment of a military base in Berbera. Naturally, Cairo saw this as a threat to its interests in the Red Sea, which had already been undermined by the efforts of Yemen’s Houthis. In response, Egypt signed a defense treaty with Somalia and deployed some ten thousand troops there by the summer of that year. In early September, joint Egyptian-Somali military exercises were announced.
It appeared that Cairo was seriously considering reigniting the long-standing conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, supporting Mogadishu’s desire to regain control over the breakaway Somaliland as well as Somalia’s historical claims to Ethiopia’s Ogaden province (a region over which the two neighboring countries fought a bitter war in the 1970s). Interestingly, al-Sisi even hinted at the possibility of giving this conflict an “Arab-wide” character by invoking the Joint Arab Defense Agreement (somewhat analogous to NATO’s Article 5). Of course, this was just a bluff: given the ongoing war in Gaza, where the Arab states have shown little unified will to fight for their Palestinian brethren, it would be absurd to expect them to rush to Somalia’s defense (even though Somalia is a member of the Arab League). It was even more amusing when Addis Ababa promptly expressed interest in joining the Arab League itself…
But Egyptian threats against Ethiopia are probably nothing more than bluff. Egypt cannot sustain a serious external conflict, whether in alliance with Somalia or even with Eritrea (which has also taken a stance against Addis Ababa). Therefore, Egypt desperately needs a serious ally and mediator to keep the escalation within reasonable limits and prevent the conflict from turning into an all-out war. Turkey, with its vested interests in the region, could serve as such an ally.
For Ankara, the Horn of Africa is a crucial strategic orientation, allowing it to project power and influence in the Red Sea and East Africa, and opening a path to the Indian Ocean. Turkey’s first overseas military base was established in Somalia in 2016, and a base in Djibouti was added in 2023. By the time Turkey renewed ties with Egypt, it was well established in the region.
In early February this year, Turkey and Somalia signed an agreement in which Turkey pledged to protect Somalia’s territorial waters for the next ten years. In September, it was revealed that Ankara plans to build a ballistic and space missile test range in the region. In effect, this means that Turkey has assumed responsibility for Somalia’s security, relieving Egypt of this burden. This has allowed Cairo to flex its muscles without the risk of being drawn into a serious conflict.
At the same time, Ankara offered its platform for Somali-Ethiopian negotiations at the level of foreign ministers. Although these talks have not yet yielded any concrete results, they have achieved one important result: Turkey has taken control of the situation. As a result, Cairo is now forced to refrain from making any sudden moves.
Against this backdrop, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi paid a reciprocal visit to Ankara. It seems that his talks with Erdoğan focused primarily on the distribution of roles: Turkey is taking the lead, effectively ensuring regional stability and steering the negotiation process, thereby taking control of the situation and consolidating its position in the region. Egypt, on the other hand, maintains a necessary level of tension that justifies Turkish intervention, but does not do anything that could hinder Turkish efforts. Egypt’s military presence on the ground will allow Cairo to save face, although in reality its forces will act as support troops for Turkey.
If our logic is correct, we can add that by falling into Turkey’s strong embrace in the Horn of Africa, Egypt is likely to be forced to play by Ankara’s rules in other areas as well: in Libya, Sudan, Gaza, and the Red Sea.