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It seems that after the October exchange of strikes, Iran and Israel have recognized the limits of permissible escalation and are on the verge of agreeing on the need for peaceful coexistence. This gives hope that the current conflict in the Middle East may gradually begin to subside.
The meticulously planned rocket attacks by Iran on Israel on October 1 and by Israel on Iran on October 26, each preceded by almost public announcements of their timing, targets, and scope, resemble staged fights between heroes from Jackie Chan or Bruce Lee movies: the characteristic battle cries are clearly heard, fists whistle through the air, legs flash at eye level, but in the end, during the filming of the episode, no one was hurt. Such high-quality imitation shows the mastery of the actors and their sense of responsibility: there must be no mistakes, because their cost is enormous — a war that would inevitably lead to a catastrophe for both states and the entire region.
After proving their ability to harm each other, Israel and Iran have made an inevitable decision in favor of peaceful coexistence. Thus, we can speak of the formation of the main supporting structure of a new regional architecture: the Tehran-Tel Aviv axis. We wrote about the necessity of its emergence three years ago, and its contours became clear in April of this year, after the provocative Israeli missile attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus.
We initially believed that the United States was the guarantor of the existence of this axis. In full accordance with Kissinger’s formula, Washington is closer to each player than they are to each other. And it manages the balance of their powers by imposing or lifting sanctions (in the case of Iran), regulating arms supplies, and exerting political pressure on the government (in the case of Israel).
As was the case three years ago, the question of how to integrate Turkey and the Arab countries (the Gulf monarchies, Egypt and Iraq) into the Tehran-Tel Aviv axis remains open. However, some assembling structures seem to be emerging.
Turkey is betting on the «Development Road» — a transport corridor from Iraq’s Basra on the Gulf coast to its Mediterranean ports. This project could become a barrier preventing direct contact between the Iranian and Israeli «security borders», thus allowing Ankara to assume the role of guarantor regulating the Iran-Israel balance.
At the same time, an important part of this balance should be the position of the Arab countries: efforts should be made to achieve their «equidistance» in relation to both Iran and Israel. In practice, this means that the «Abraham Accords» need to be balanced with a corresponding system of Arab-Iranian relations. The «Development Road» offers such an opportunity. (In this regard, the news of joint naval exercises between Saudi Arabia and Iran is noteworthy).
If our hypothesis is correct, we should expect a relative stabilization of the Iran-Israel confrontation and an intensification of the (still purely unofficial) work along the Turkey-Iran and Turkey-Israel lines. The goal is to achieve the most advantageous conditions for each of them.
What might that mean?
If the potential for Iranian-Israeli escalation is exhausted and further raising the stakes is impossible, then the first thing to negotiate is the terms of a gradual de-escalation and the extent of mutual concessions. Judging by how the situation in Lebanon is developing, Tehran will have to relinquish its dominance there. The olive tree planted on the Lebanese-Israeli border by the late Iranian Foreign Minister Amir Abdollahian has not taken root. It is highly likely that the IDF’s military actions in Lebanon will eventually be halted, followed by negotiations, after which Hezbollah will withdraw to a safe distance. This would mean a reduction in Iranian influence — quite substantial — to a level acceptable to Israel.
An alternative — and a very likely one — could be a new civil war in Lebanon. This would allow Israel to create the necessary security zone and withdraw from active involvement, concentrating on strengthening its northern borders. At the same time, such a development could give Turkey a pretext to intervene and expand its area of contact and strategic bargaining with Iran (in addition to Syria, Iraq, and the Caucasus).
All this leads to the conclusion that Iran will be forced to accept the «loss» (partial, conditional, but very unpleasant) of Lebanon and possibly Syria. In the future, the extent of Iran’s presence there will be determined on the basis of agreements with Ankara. This is, of course, disconcerting…
But in return, Iran apparently intends to hold on to its positions in Iraq. It is no coincidence that President Pezeshkian made his first foreign visit to Iraq, visiting not only Baghdad but also Kurdish Erbil in the north and Sunni Basra in the south of the country. It seems that Iraq will become a «mirror image» of Syria and Lebanon: here, Iran will determine what the Turkish presence will look like. In the end, the security and prosperity of the «Development Road» depends on Iran: without Tehran’s consent, the project is not feasible. (Let us recall that the USA confirms its intention to withdraw most of its troops from Iraq).
In this logic, the rumors that the Iranians are planning another retaliatory strike against Israel from Iraqi territory seem quite plausible. If such an attack does take place, it will most likely be as symbolic as the previous ones. Its aim is not to inflict serious damage on the Jewish state, but to demonstrate that Iraq is a security zone for the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is quite possible that the Americans will allow this, which would show the real degree of understanding between Washington and Tehran. An Israeli response against Iraq is unlikely, as it would pose a threat to American bases.
From the perspective of Russia’s interests, such a development of the situation seems to be quite acceptable and even beneficial, especially considering the opportunities opened by the signing of a strategic agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The greatest risks associated with this document — the likelihood that Iran will draw Russia into a military confrontation with Israel — are beginning to diminish. And as negotiations between Iran and Turkey progress, the importance of Moscow’s close partnerships with Tehran and Ankara (as well as with all other participants in regional processes) will increase.