The Aleppo tragedy: what it will mean for Syria

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The escalation in the Syrian Arab Republic, where militants from terrorist groups have launched a major offensive, came as a surprise to the global media. But was it really unexpected?

On November 26, fighters from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, outlawed in Russia), along with other terrorist and opposition groups, launched a massive offensive on Aleppo. At the time of writing, the Syrian army has already lost control of the suburbs of the provincial capital of the same name, and fighting continues directly in the city itself. Other sources report that the Aleppo Citadel, which heroically held out during the previous war with ISIS (a terrorist organization outlawed in the Russian Federation), has also fallen, as has Aleppo itself. The Kuweires airbase has also fallen under the control of the militants.

In addition to Aleppo, there are reports that the Syrian National Army (SNA, an armed opposition group backed by Turkey) has captured the town of Tadif, 32 kilometers from Aleppo. The M5 highway — the main artery connecting cities such as Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo — has been cut off.

Militant formations also quickly entered the city of Hama, where they were finally stopped by the Syrian military forces. In the city of Daraa, militants who had previously gone through the «reconciliation» process launched an uprising. In addition, groups from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) are attempting to attack nearby areas from the U.S.-controlled zone of Al-Tanf. Attacks have also been reported near Deir ez-Zor in the eastern part of the country.

The situation in Syria is deteriorating rapidly and is on the verge of becoming critical, especially considering that, according to the Syrian military, it has carried out the well-known maneuver of «redeployment to save civilian lives» (apparently, HTS fighters do not pose a personal threat to them…).

In mid-October, the first reports surfaced that Russian aviation had begun to conduct large-scale airstrikes by local standards. The Syrian army moved units into the Aleppo and Idlib regions, leading experts to seriously discuss the likelihood of a new escalation in the Syrian Arab Republic. Whether this was preparation for a possible terrorist offensive, or whether the Russian Aerospace Forces were simply striking to weaken outlawed groups, is hard to say. However, the fact remains that by using small-group tactics — used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 2022 and NATO forces in various conflicts, including those in the Middle East — the terrorists managed to penetrate deeply into Syrian military positions and then organize a large-scale offensive with significant forces.

An important military aspect to note is that during the years of confrontation with ISIS, the fighters were mostly poorly armed, untrained, and lacked equipment and weapons. Today, however, they are equipped and trained on a par with the Syrian government forces: they have communications, transportation, weapons, equipment and even artillery, as well as various types of UAVs.

In addition, the terrorists have their own “war correspondents” marked “PRESS. At least one of them reports in Russian, apparently from one of the Central Asian countries.

It is obvious that they have gained — or been helped to gain — experience from the conflict in Ukraine, given that Kiev has previously supplied weapons to terrorists in Syria, including through Turkey, which is undoubtedly involved in current events.

First, both HTS and SNA have close ties to Ankara; Turkey has even paid salaries to SNA fighters. Second, there are reports that Turkish «Bayraktar» drones have been seen in the sky. If we recall that during the Second Karabakh War there was much talk about the participation of Turkish-backed Syrian militants on the side of Azerbaijan, the likelihood of Ankara’s involvement increases even more.

What a coincidence! According to recent media reports, the U.S. is likely to approve the delivery of F-35 fighter jets to Turkey, previously blocked by sanctions imposed on the country, as well as the deployment of Russian S-400 air defense systems.

In sum, Ankara wants to join BRICS and receive Russian gas while maintaining ties with NATO and buying F-35 — not to mention eyeing a piece of Syria. Once again we see Erdoğan’s multi-vector policy, and this time he has clearly not chosen Assad.

So why has the escalation started now? On the one hand, we cannot overlook Israel, which is extremely concerned about arms supplies to Hezbollah. Although it is unlikely to be directly involved in the militants’ offensive, we should remember that even in 2017 there were reports and testimonies that the Israeli authorities were supporting certain armed opposition groups fighting against Assad.

The outbreak of a new round of conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic would benefit Netanyahu and his government by diverting global media attention from his harsh actions in Gaza and southern Lebanon. At the same time, it would severely impact Syria by disrupting the logistics of Iran-aligned groups.

Coincidentally, reports are circulating online that the radios and pagers of Syrian Arab Army commanders are inexplicably exploding. It’s unlikely that faulty batteries are to blame…

On the other hand, the escalation in Syria — where Russia had previously stabilized the situation — is a serious blow to Moscow’s ambitions and image. In essence, it’s the opening of a second front, albeit a less important one, to which the Russian authorities will be forced to devote considerable resources and forces, especially given the Syrian army’s current inability to quickly turn the situation in its favor.

Moreover, this “second front” has opened just as the Russian army is making successful advances in its special military operation. At the same time, a new wave of protests has begun in Georgia; Armenia’s new 32-year-old justice minister, Srbuhi Galyan, has made her first official trip to the U.S.; and NATO has begun a new round of exercises near the borders of Russia’s Kaliningrad region. The atmosphere around Russia and in the regions of its direct interest is heating up, intensifying as Donald Trump’s inauguration approaches. It seems that the Biden administration intends to make a grand exit by creating the most difficult conditions for the Republicans over the next four years.

For now, experts believe that a repeat of the tragic war with ISIS — when terrorists stood at the gates of Damascus — is unlikely. But many questions remain. According to Telegram channels and media reports, intelligence services in Syria, including Russian intelligence, warned of the likelihood of a militant offensive. Yet even with the redeployment of Syrian Arab Army troops, the Syrians have failed to mount a significant response.

In this context, it’s important to note that in recent years, while the world community has been preoccupied with Ukraine and Israel, equally significant events have been unfolding in Syria. Their significance has now become clear. Bashar al-Assad gradually distanced himself from Russia and tried to chart his own course. He tried to establish relations with Erdoğan — who has now clearly chosen a different path — and also moved closer to Iran, whose policies are also questionable today. The Syrian authorities did not take active steps to resolve the issue of the Idlib de-escalation zone, there was no tangible benefit from rejoining the Arab League, nor did large-scale reconstruction of the country begin. Its economy remained in a disastrous state throughout these years.

From a military perspective, the Syrian government did not conduct any large-scale exercises or modernization efforts after 2020, when the status quo was established. Previously, militants resembled peasants, while the Syrian army consisted of well-trained (often graduates of Soviet military academies) professionals. By 2024, the situation has reversed: poorly equipped and trained Syrian soldiers are retreating under the onslaught of well-armed and trained terrorists.

Although experts expect the situation in Syria to stabilize and believe that the army can stop tens of thousands of militants and terrorists (with estimates of HTS alone over 20,000 fighters, the Turkistan Islamic Party [banned in Russia] around 4,000, the SNA over 20,000, along with numerous other groups), it’s unclear where this stand will occur. Apparently, there were no significant defensive positions even around militant-held zones.

The problem goes much deeper: Assad and the Syrian authorities have not only failed to learn from years of war, they have not made sufficient efforts to prevent its recurrence. In this context, regaining control of lost territory is an extremely difficult task that will result in numerous casualties. Worse, there is no guarantee that similar events won’t happen again. Unlike in 2014, Russia and Iran are now preoccupied with their own problems, as is China, which is preparing for a confrontation with a Trump-led U.S. The situations around Taiwan and North Korea cannot be ignored either. Syria risks finding itself in a difficult position: aid will come, but probably in much smaller amounts than needed.

This time, Russia and its air force — already actively operating in the skies over Aleppo — will likely enable the Syrian Arab Army to hold off the terrorists, albeit at the cost of significant losses in manpower and territory. What will happen next, and what political consequences Assad will face, is hard to predict.

Meanwhile, Israel and the United States have already begun consultations in anticipation of the possible fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government.