AP
The overthrow of Assad in Syria, which caused quite a stir, was not entirely unexpected. At least not for the readers of «GEOFOR»: already at the end of November, we suggested that something like this could happen. And it is not about the sudden «weakness» of the regime (after all, it lasted for 15 years under conditions of constant war, occupation of a significant part of its territory and a harsh external blockade).
From a geopolitical perspective, Assad fell victim to the Iranian-Turkish game. Simply put, Turkey pushed Iran out of Syria, and Tehran thought it best to surrender to Ankara without a fight. There are many reasons for this willingness to compromise, but it is worth emphasizing that Iran is demonstrating its ability to act as a «responsible» regional power. It is willing to take into account the interests of another player (Turkey) and is acting to achieve a mutually acceptable outcome.
The result seems to be this: Turkey takes Syria while Iran takes Iraq. We have already written that the government of Iranian President Pezeshkian has made it clear that Iraq is a vital sphere of interest for Iranians, Turks, and Arabs alike. However, Tehran should remain the «dispatcher» there, because otherwise stability in the region is out of the question, which would hurt Ankara as well as the Arab world.
If our reasoning is correct, then any discussion of the future of the Middle East brings us back to its greatest mystery: the future of Iraq. If the formula «Syria for Turkey, Iraq for Iran» is confirmed and respected by both regional (Israel, the Arab states) and global (the US, Britain, Russia, China) powers, there may be a chance for the emergence of a truly new Middle East. But if Iran’s willingness to compromise is interpreted as weakness and the pressure on it continues to grow, the region could face a new catastrophe.
It is reasonable to assume that in order to avoid such a scenario, Iran will raise the issue of revising its nuclear policy more explicitly and decisively. It would not be surprising if in the near future we witness a demonstrative test of nuclear weapons, forcing the world to recognize Tehran’s nuclear status. This could be followed by the conclusion of some kind of Iran-Iraq strategic agreement that would effectively place Baghdad under the Islamic Republic’s «nuclear umbrella». This move would likely serve as a strong warning to the Islamic Republic’s current and potential adversaries. Such a move could trigger a regional arms race, heightened political tensions, and something akin to a «Cold War», but without catastrophic consequences.
However, one should not rule out the possibility that Tehran might attempt to deploy elements of its nuclear forces in Iraq (similar to what Russia did in Belarus). This would inevitably be seen as upsetting the regional balance, would be met with a harsh response, and would lead to renewed destabilization.
In any case, Iran is likely to abandon its ambitions for influence beyond Iraq, whether in Syria, Gaza, or the West Bank of the Jordan River. It is quite possible that Tehran’s interest in Yemen will also cool significantly, and the Israelis may then feel free to «punish» the Houthis for their attacks on Israeli territory. Meanwhile, in the time it would take for this to happen, Iran might manage to unveil its nuclear bomb.
Either way, we believe that the Islamic Republic of Iran will generally abide by the rules of the strategic game and refrain from expansionist projects, focusing instead on its internal problems, Iraq, and building its nuclear shield.
Turkey, for its part, faces somewhat different tasks. First, it must stabilize Syria and establish what could be called a «normal political process» there. It should be noted that no one is likely to seriously obstruct Ankara, but at the same time, Turkey should not expect significant help from anyone. The most likely scenario is that both regional and global powers will simply watch Ankara get bogged down in the Syrian quagmire.
Second, Turkey will have to implement the demands it has put forward — first and foremost the principle of the territorial integrity and unity of the Syrian state. This is not just about the Kurds, who are seeking autonomy or even independence. It is also about the Golan Heights: both the part previously annexed by Israel and the part recently occupied by Israel.
Third, Ankara will have to rethink and reframe its approach to the Kurdish problem. The key objective, it seems, will be to create an effective pro-Turkish Kurdish force that could gain representation in the new Syrian administration while maintaining ties and influence in Iraqi Kurdistan. To achieve this, Turkey will have to cooperate with the Americans, the Iranians, and even the Israelis (Tel Aviv has already openly talked about supporting the Syrian Kurds).
In addressing these and many other no less complex challenges, Turkey will be forced to deftly maneuver, seeking situational support from one external ally or another. It cannot afford to rely on a single partner — say, the United States. On the contrary, it is likely that Turkey will not «simplify» matters by pushing out those already present in Syria. To avoid getting bogged down in the Syrian quagmire, Ankara can actively play on the interests of Russia, the United States, Israel, Iran, the Arab countries, and the Europeans — seeking help from each of them at the right time and in the right place.
If our logic is correct, then it is too early to talk about the loss of Russia’s positions and bases in Syria; one should not expect their closure. However, it must be admitted that Moscow has lost the initiative (hopefully only temporarily). Russia will probably have to prepare for Turkey’s attempts to shift the burden of carrying out numerous relatively minor, tactical tasks to it in exchange for allowing Russia to maintain its military and political presence in Syria.
For Russia, the collapse of the Assad regime has another important consequence: it affects relations with Iran and the prospects of signing a «major strategic agreement» with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran’s withdrawal from Syria removes a significant part of the risks we have pointed out earlier — namely, the possibility of Russia being dragged into Tehran’s military adventures. Under these conditions, a strategic alliance with Iran becomes less risky for Moscow. But another question arises: how interested will Iran be in partnering with Russia in these new realities? Won’t Tehran decide that a partnership with Turkey and the United States is more beneficial than an alliance with the Russian Federation?