AP
2024 was marked by the «Al-Aqsa Flood»: the regional situation unfolded according to the logic established by the events of October 7, 2023. It is quite possible that the current year will be marked by a «Syrian Winter», with the Middle East evolving in line with the logic set by the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024.
At the heart of current developments, we continue to see an ongoing process of balancing between four regional centers: Israel, Iran, Turkey, and the Arab world (the Gulf monarchies, Iraq, and Egypt). The results of the past year can be summarized roughly as follows:
- Iran’s influence, having reached its peak, has sharply declined, and Tehran has lost Syria and its strategic initiative. The Islamic Republic of Iran is moving into strategic defense.
- Turkey’s influence is on the rise, replacing Iran’s. Ankara rightly sees itself as the main beneficiary of the fall of Assad in Damascus, and the initiative now belongs to Turkey.
- Israel has managed to cope with unprecedented threats and must now decide whether to continue to advance and fight to wrest the initiative from Turkey, or to «pass» for a time and focus on internal issues.
- The Arab world, as usual, finds itself in a dual position: on the one hand, it lacks the initiative and cannot compete for it, forcing it to adapt to the changing dynamics of each moment; on the other hand, it has resources that, if used skillfully, can influence changes in the balance of power among the three leading players.
Under these conditions, the first group of risks to pay attention to is related to Iran as the weak link. The main question can be formulated as follows: Will its adversaries try to «finish it off»?
Undoubtedly, the Israelis would like to strike the strongest possible blow to «finish off the enemy in his lair». It is no coincidence that there has been talk of how — after eliminating Syria’s military potential — now would be the perfect time to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. All the more so because it would almost inevitably lead to the destabilization of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the dismantling of the mullahs’ regime, etc.
It seems likely, however, that as tempting as this may be, there will be enough willpower to reject it. The implementation of such a scenario would inevitably lead to a regional catastrophe: the collapse of Iran could trigger powerful waves of instability that would hit Iraq, the South Caucasus, and the Gulf. The consequences would be unpredictable for Israel as well as for the other power centers — Turkey and the Arab world. Moreover, no one can predict which forces would ultimately come to power in Iran or whose hands Iranian missiles and nuclear weapons might end up in (we have no doubt that Tehran already possesses nuclear weapons). Such risks seem unacceptable.
This does not mean that Iran can rest easy. Domestic tensions there will continue to rise, possibly leading to a transformation of the regime: the «expansionism» of the ayatollahs could be replaced by the «isolationism» of the nationalist pragmatists. It would seem that such a turn of events would serve the interests of Iran’s neighbors (Turkey, the Arab states, and the more rational segment of Israelis). In other words, instead of a massive, uncontrollable destabilization, all parties would prefer some sort of «palace coup». It is not impossible that something of this kind is already in the works in Iran following the inauguration of President Pezeshkian.
If this is indeed the case — if the regime in the Islamic Republic mutates and the country manages to avoid a destructive explosion — then in the not too distant future the world may see a «new Iran»: a «responsible» actor with nuclear weapons that everyone will be forced to recognize and accept.
Against this background, attention should be paid to another set of risks associated with the emergence of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Paradoxical as it may seem, in some ways the nuclear factor may even help to stabilize the situation here, since the mere fact of possessing nuclear weapons — at least by two opposing sides — imposes various constraints and obligations.
We have already witnessed exchanges of strikes between Iran and Israel, and the nature of these exchanges suggests that both sides understand the potential consequences of ill-considered, uncoordinated actions. There is no doubt that Tehran and Tel Aviv have established reliable channels of communication and developed rules of engagement necessary for nuclear powers.
If that is the case, what risks are we talking about?
We are talking about Turkey, which is reluctant to accept its non-nuclear status while surrounded by two nuclear-armed neighbors. It would not be surprising if it turned out that Turkey’s military-industrial complex, which is currently experiencing a strong upswing, is ready to produce its own nuclear weapons. After all, Turkey has managed to establish world-class drone production. Next in line are missiles: a test site for missile technology is already under construction in Somalia. As for warheads, Iran, Pakistan, North Korea, and India have shown that achieving nuclear capabilities is by no means impossible.
If Turkey follows Israel and Iran in acquiring nuclear status, the Arab states may follow suit; there is already talk of similar ambitions on the part of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As a result, the Middle East would indeed acquire a fundamentally new quality: it would become saturated with nuclear weapons. To exaggerate somewhat, nuclear weapons would become as common there as the Kalashnikov rifle or the «jihad-mobile». In this scenario, nuclear weapons would cease to be a stabilizing factor (as they might have been with only two nuclear poles — Iran and Israel) and instead become a powerful source of insecurity.
The problem is that none of the issues at the root of the conflicts in the Middle East have been resolved. We see all too clearly what that has done to the region today. But it is impossible to imagine what would happen if every regional actor acquired nuclear weapons. All the more so because, in such a situation, the ability of external global actors to influence the region would be reduced almost to zero.
The third group of risks, closely related to the first two, is Islamism. Whatever form it takes — «political» Islam, extremism, terrorism, or, in Islamic terms, «Takfirism», «Salafism», etc. — there is no doubt that Islamic models of political and social organization are spreading across the region. Syria is the latest victim.
The fall of the Assad regime could turn Syria into a kind of Afghanistan — a base for Islamism. From there, future attacks on neighboring countries could be launched. The priority targets could be Turkey and Saudi Arabia (and not necessarily Israel, which may well be happy to play the role of «puppet master» to keep its neighbors and competitors in check).
It seems that Turkey has made a big mistake (one it could hardly have avoided) by betting on the Islamists of HTS (Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham — a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation). It has grabbed the tiger by the tail, and now it is almost impossible to let go. Having pinned its hopes of reversing the outcome of World War I on the Islamists, Ankara will be forced to take their interests into account, first in Syria and then in the region. The most dangerous prospect, however, is the very likely increase in Islamist influence within Turkey itself. The question is probably not how effectively the current Erdoğan regime can control Islamism, but how long it can continue to do so.
As for Saudi Arabia, it is taking a considerable risk by pursuing a hyperactive policy of Westernization. This policy of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is reminiscent of the actions of the last Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. And one should not be too surprised if it provokes a strong backlash from the Muslim community both within the kingdom and in neighboring monarchies.
From this perspective, one might ask: What strategy would be appropriate for Russia?
It seems crucial for Russia to make preparing for the nuclearization and Islamization of the Middle East its primary objective. Hopes for restoring regional stability are slim. Of course, it is possible that the intensity of the passions — which has skyrocketed since October 7, 2023 — will subside, but in the medium term new local flare-ups can be expected.
The regional powers’ quest for nuclear weapons — a major external and internal threat — will continue. Expansionism as the main means of securing national interests will also continue. Conversely, the influence (though not the attempts to exert it) of global players will continue to decline. All this leads to increased unpredictability.
Under these conditions, it is necessary to ensure not only a presence on the ground and the ability to intervene at the right moment, but also the ability to «disengage» quickly and without loss. Ideally, not too far away, in order to maintain options for rapid action and, when favorable circumstances arise, for equally rapid return.
It is quite possible that such a plan explains what has been decided about the Russian bases in Syria: according to some reports, they may be moved to Libya or Algeria. We should add that Sudan could also be an option. Special attention should be paid to the South Caucasus, especially Azerbaijan (since Armenia is turning its back on Russia).
We should also mention relations with Iran and the long-planned strategic treaty with that country. It seems that now is quite an opportune time to conclude it: Tehran is moving into the defense sector, which means that the risks of Russia being drawn into its expansionist ventures are minimal.
One should also consider the possibility of changes in Turkish policy. The successes in Syria (and not only there) have opened new horizons for the Turks, but also created new challenges. It cannot be ruled out that as the situation in which Ankara operates evolves, the need for a change in strategy or leadership may arise. Undoubtedly, Erdoğan has created a whole new Turkey and a whole new regional environment. The question, however, is whether he can continue to move the country and the region forward-especially in the face of Islamism.
As for Islamism itself, Russia would have to reassess it and figure out how to engage with it. We can already see movement in this direction if we look at the example of the Afghan Taliban (a terrorist organization banned in Russia). Similarly, with regard to HTS (Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham — a terrorist organization banned in Russia), there have already been calls for this (from Grozny). Therefore, it seems essential to rethink and update Russia’s policy on such a broad and persistent phenomenon as Islamism.