As the long-awaited «comprehensive» Russian-Iranian treaty is about to be signed, much criticism has been leveled at Russian diplomacy. Are the skeptics’ concerns justified?
Many commentators have wondered why the Kremlin would sign this strategic document with today’s «weak» Iran rather than the «strong» Iran of, let us say, a year ago. Presumably, the implication is that if the treaty had been signed earlier, Moscow and Tehran could have prevented Assad’s fall and saved Syria. At the same time, they would have halted Armenia’s rapid drift to the West and created a barrier to Turkey’s expansion in the Levant and the Caucasus.
It seems that such criticism is unfounded. On the contrary, the fact that the Russian-Iranian treaty is being signed right now testifies to Moscow’s highly responsible and balanced approach to relations with Tehran. And this is certainly good news.
The point is that the era of a «strong» Iran — when the flag of the Islamic Republic flew on the Lebanese-Israeli border — was fraught with risks. At that time, a strategic partnership with the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) would have put Russia in a subordinate position: Tehran had the initiative and would have done everything possible to use Russian resources for its own ends.
The ease with which the Iranians left Syria in December 2024 clearly shows that they had no intention of fighting for Assad on their own. A treaty with Russia (had it existed at the time) would have allowed them to call on «Russian Ivan» for help and, crucially, to shift responsibility to him. In a Russia-IRI tandem, Russia will always be seen as the stronger side and thus blamed for everything, even if it was actually fighting someone else’s battle. Russia would have been blamed for the «death of Syrian children» and for siding with the «main enemy of Israel», which would inevitably be seen as the «enemy of the Arabs». The end result would have been the formation of an anti-Iranian and anti-Russian front between Israel, Turkey and the Arab monarchies. Why pay such a price to preserve Assad’s regime, especially when it would have had to be changed anyway — and it’s far from clear that Moscow and Tehran could have agreed on a mutually acceptable replacement?
Thus, if Russia had fallen into this trap and made strategic agreements with Iran when Tehran was at the height of its «power», it would have ultimately led to the loss of Moscow’s positions in the Middle East and turned into a defeat — especially because, we must emphasize, the initiative would have been in Iran’s hands.
But now the situation has changed. Tehran has lost the initiative. As a result, the risk of Russia being drawn into Iran’s game in a subordinate role has been greatly reduced. Tehran needs Russian resources not for expansion or to defend its previous gains, but simply to hold on to what is left and to respond more effectively to the actions of other players. And the outcome of this round depends on Russia.