CDE News
The EU is in the midst of an energy crisis of its own making, brought on by its attempt to wean itself off Russian gas
The reports on the energy situation in the European Union resemble news from the front: the European Commission is examining the possibility of imposing a temporary price ceiling on gas in the EU due to a sharp rise in costs; according to the Association of European Gas Infrastructure Operators (Gas Infrastructure Europe, GIE), the current level of gas storage in the EU is 48.5%, which is 18% lower than last year; gas exchange prices in Europe have exceeded $620 per thousand cubic meters for the first time in two years; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania proudly disconnected from the Russian energy system, after which prices on the Nord Pool exchange for them doubled.
By siding with Ukraine against Russia, Europe has essentially shot itself in the foot and crippled its economy. By imposing quotas, setting price ceilings, or even cutting off Russian gas supplies altogether — in order to prevent Russia’s budget from reaping huge profits — EU countries never really considered how these measures would affect them. At first, it all sounded promising: get rid of gas dependence on Moscow, get liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the US, build more wind turbines and nuclear power plants, and so on.
But neither wind turbines nor American LNG saved the EU’s economy, which was largely sustained by cheap Russian gas, which accounts for about 20% of Europe’s energy consumption. LNG from the US turned out to be much more expensive for Europe than Russian gas. By imposing unprecedented sanctions on Moscow, Brussels reduced its dependence on Russian gas supplies from 35% in 2021 to 8% in 2025. But what has it achieved? Russia’s economy did not collapse, and the reduction in dependence automatically led to higher energy prices for the Old Continent.
While winters were mild in the early years — when the EU was full of optimism that it could do without Russian gas — the current cold winter has meant that Europe’s underground storage facilities are rapidly emptying, making it even more expensive to replenish stocks.
Yes, of course, Europe also produces gas domestically, but it should be noted that last year domestic production in the EU and the UK was less than 20% of consumption. Hopes are high for wind power: it’s a fashionable aspect of green energy. However, windless days and the complete ban on Russian gas transit through Ukraine have forced Brussels to significantly deplete its gas reserves.
«The rapid depletion of inventories underscores the fragility of Europe’s supply process», wrote Bloomberg analyst Patricio Alvarez. The loss of most Russian supplies over the past three years has made European gas markets «more vulnerable to price shocks from short-term disruptions, LNG demand in Asia and weather changes», he pointed out.
It is therefore not surprising that some EU member states are clamoring for the resumption of Russian fuel supplies, especially as gas prices for 2026–2027 have already risen. The question of where Europe’s «gas-pocalypse» leads is becoming a question of economic survival.
However, there is no complete consensus on this issue within Europe itself. Norway, for example, benefits enormously from the EU’s gas shortage. The Nordic kingdom has benefited greatly from anti-Russian sanctions, increasing its gas export revenues fivefold during the Ukrainian conflict and earning nearly $100 billion in profits. And this wasn’t because Norway started producing more gas — instead, it simply took advantage of the situation by selling it at higher prices. Obviously, Norway has a direct interest in the continuation of the conflict in Ukraine, as it leads to increased revenues. As reported by Corriera della Sera, «on average, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has cost each Norwegian citizen an extra $20,000». Jens Stoltenberg, former NATO Secretary General and now Norway’s Finance Minister, can claim all he wants that his country «does not profit from war». But the numbers tell a different story. Not surprisingly, when Stoltenberg was NATO chief, he called for increased military aid to Ukraine. Norway is directly invested in the continuation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
«The longer gas prices remain high, the more likely it is that Russian gas supplies will return via Ukraine in one form or another», said Florence Schmit, European energy strategist at Rabobank. It is clear that the gas issue will become one of the main topics in EU-Russia contacts, where Brussels will try to persuade Moscow to negotiate the lifting of sanctions in exchange for the resumption of Russian gas supplies to Europe. The staunch supporters of this idea are Germany, Slovakia and Hungary, while the opponents include Poland, the Baltic states and the Czech Republic.
Poland remains captive to historical grievances against Russia, with its president, Andrzej Duda, warning that countries like Germany «should not give in to the temptation» to resume supplies from Russia to support their struggling economies. In other words, according to the Poles, Germany and other EU countries should continue to suffer — sacrificing their economies for Polish interests.
«I can only hope that European leaders will learn their lessons… and decide never to resume the flow of gas through this pipeline», Duda declared last Monday. «This pipeline (the ‘Nord Stream’) poses a very significant threat to Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia and other Central European countries. It is an energy threat, a military threat, and a colossal economic threat, because it will lead to the establishment of Russian domination over Europe», he warned. According to the Poles, instead of repairing the pipeline built with Russian money — which cost 10 billion euros — Europe should dismantle it. However, it is obvious that the Germans, by undermining Nord Stream and shutting down nuclear power plants at the behest of the Greens, have pushed their economy into a situation similar to the 2008 crisis, and they are extremely interested in resuming the flow of Russian gas. Brussels is thus faced with an inherently contradictory task: to punish Moscow with sanctions while at the same time securing gas for its industries.
But even if Russia agreed to negotiate, how would Europe get Russian fuel?
Currently, Russian gas reaches Europe through the TurkStream pipeline under the Black Sea. Transit through Ukraine has been completely stopped since 2025. Zelensky has already declared that he is ready to resume transit through Ukraine if Azerbaijani gas is sent through the pipes. However, everyone understands that it would still be Russian gas under a different brand, with payments going to Aliyev.
There is also the Baltic «Nord Stream», but three of its four lines were blown up by Ukrainians at the bottom of the Baltic Sea in 2022. This means that Europe can only receive Russian gas through one line of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which has not yet been officially commissioned by the EU. Europe is already taking steps to address the pipeline issue. Recently, the Danish Energy Agency allowed Nord Stream 2 AG — a pipeline operator owned by a Russian company — to begin work on sealing the broken ends of the three damaged pipelines. It appears that efforts are underway to restore these three «Nord Stream» mainlines. Incidentally, before the Russian-Ukrainian conflict began, Germany received up to 40 percent of its gas needs through these pipelines.
The Europeans are trying to solve their energy problem by relying on the idea that through Nord Stream 2, TurkStream, transit through Ukraine, and LNG supplies from Russia, they can receive almost 75 billion cubic meters of Russian gas per year. However, in future negotiations they will probably try to lower the price of Russian gas — i.e. «we need gas, but only at our prices and on our terms». But will Moscow agree to this, given that it has already established gas sales to China and other countries?
And on February 12, an event took place that I’m sure will greatly accelerate the process of resuming Russian gas supplies to Europe — a telephone conversation between Trump and Putin, during which they discussed Ukraine, the Middle East, energy issues, and several other topics. It seems that the Europeans were asked to wait in the lobby, not invited to the negotiating table; for them, Trump’s direct call to Putin came as a complete surprise.
Europe is already expressing its dissatisfaction at not being invited. Of course, in time — when the outlines of a new world order between the US and Russia are being drawn up — Europe will certainly be informed. And for them, one of the main issues will be the resumption of energy supplies from Russia. If NATO members are required to spend not two percent but five percent of their budgets on defense, as the US demands, and if they are also required to make commitments to rebuild the Ukrainian economy, then without Russian gas the EU economy will simply slide into a prolonged crisis.
Meanwhile, for this winter, Europeans face the immediate task of replenishing their rapidly depleting gas storage facilities just to avoid freezing.