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As-faerniaty / Goodfon
The article “After the Flood” (February 11, 2025) presented a vision of the internal dynamics in the formation of a new architecture in the Middle East — one that disregards external influence. Such influence, however, cannot be ignored
First and foremost, this is, of course, about the «Trump factor» — that is, the unprecedented pressure that the current American president is exerting on the region. Notable are the threats to «open the gates of hell» if a quick ceasefire in Gaza is not achieved or if his conditions are not fully met, as well as the idea of expelling the Palestinians from Gaza and placing the territory under US control.
All this seems very dramatic and spectacular. At first glance, it even seems effective: after all, a ceasefire was signed between Hamas and Israel after the first «hellish» threat. But a closer look reveals a different picture.
For example, it is not very clear who in the region could be afraid of «hell». If what happened in Gaza after October 7, 2023, does not qualify as hell, then what exactly qualifies as hell remains uncertain. At the very least, the Palestinians were the last to be impressed by Trump’s bombastic words — and it is unlikely that they would be rattled by another «hellish» outburst from Washington.
In light of this, it seems that the rapid progress in negotiating a ceasefire was necessary first and foremost for Trump himself. He was able to demonstrate that a single word from him was enough to stop the bloodshed. But what if he had been allowed to show that? Without a ceasefire, Trump would have had to stand by his words and really «unleash hell» — that is, send American troops into Gaza. In essence, he would have been forced to begin his administration with what he swore he would never do — a new war. He could hardly have afforded that, but he would have had no alternative. And without the goodwill of the other side, he would have been in an unenviable position.
In other words, one can assume that from the very first steps of the current U.S. administration, there was an arrangement between the White House and a very influential actor in the region. It is not unlikely that at least part of this agreement was a condition that Trump would not send American troops to the Middle East — limiting himself to «thunder and lightning» (or, at worst, using PMC forces) — while local forces were expected to «tremble». Behind this noisy front, the real work was to be done to establish regional balances while minimizing the American presence — and thus Washington’s responsibility for the fallout.
Within this framework, one can take the next step and assume that the influential regional powers acting as Trump’s partners in this scenario are none other than Iran, Israel and Turkey — the main pillars of the emerging regional structure. Iran and Israel, in particular, provide a high-quality dramatic spectacle around the ceasefire and the continuation of an exciting action movie full of «exchanges of threats and blows», which gives Trump the opportunity to demonstrate his «omnipotence». At the same time, however, Tehran and Tel Aviv guarantee that they will not force Washington into the necessity of direct military intervention — that is, they will not start a war.
Meanwhile, Turkey is integrating Arab countries into a new regional organization — the foundation of a cooperative axis that we discussed earlier. Ankara is creating an «anti-ISIS» (and anti-Kurdish) front with the participation of Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Obviously, this structure under Ankara’s leadership is meant to justify the withdrawal of American forces from Syria (as Trump also declared) and to serve as a barrier between Iran and Israel.
If we continue to develop the hypothesis of the existence of multilateral agreements behind the scenes in the region, the idea of the expulsion of the Palestinians from Gaza and the transfer of the territory to American control should be reassessed. It is very possible that these are not just empty words of the businessman-president.
Of course, neither Egypt nor Jordan will accept (or even be able to accept) Palestinians from Gaza. There is no need to discuss this point at length. However, they might well support the resettlement of these people in another country, and indeed welcome it with great relief. Within the Russian expert community, Syria has already been pointed out as a likely candidate, given the suspiciously quick and uncomplicated change of power there.
Indeed, it is quite conceivable that the new authorities in Damascus would be willing to accept the Palestinian diaspora — if massive aid is provided. Assistance that Trump can provide by mobilizing Arab billions from the Gulf and, for example, supplementing them with some of the reallocated funds from USAID. Meanwhile, as is now widely acknowledged, Syria has come under Turkish control. This means that all responsibility for how the situation unfolds rests with Ankara. Of course, this is a terrible headache, but in return the Turks can secure the necessary financial resources to develop the Levantine part of their Ottoman heritage — in essence, to restore their dominance in the region. And most importantly, Turkey’s role as an effective barrier between the two warring sides — Iran and Israel — will become even more pronounced.
At the same time, no one is asking Turkey to abandon the thesis of the necessity of creating a Palestinian state. On the contrary, it can remain faithful to the ideal of a «two-state solution» and thereby maintain its credibility in the Arab and Islamic world. (It should be noted that neither Israel nor Iran shares the idea of «two states»). Moreover, by agreeing to the resettlement of Palestinians in Syria, Turkey will have the opportunity to form a powerful and highly combat-capable force — a kind of «Palestinian Legion» that could become a strong asset in the regional game in the long run.
If the situation is indeed unfolding in this way, then the «Trump factor» does not contradict at all the natural course of events we have been considering: Israel and Iran are ensuring a «balance on the brink of a major war» that should preclude the emergence of «accidental» conflicts. In other words, the threat of an Iran-Israel war capable of destroying the entire region minimizes the risk of smaller «detonators» (whether terrorist, territorial, interreligious, etc.). Meanwhile, Turkey is responsible for quelling such local flare-ups wherever and whenever they occur, and is engaged in economic and infrastructure development projects in partnership with the Arabs, involving both Iranians and Israelis.
As for America, it will have the opportunity to implement plans that were outlined back in the Bush Jr. era: gradually shedding responsibility for the Middle East and shifting its strategic focus to the competition with China.
It is quite possible that things will proceed along these lines at this stage. But it is hard to be certain that in twenty years, when a new generation of Palestinians comes of age, the region will not plunge back into conflict.