The Geopolitics of Islam: Is the "Age of Turkey" Coming?

The dramatic events in the Middle East since October 7, 2023 — the «Flood of al-Aqsa», the war in Gaza, and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria — have led to radical changes in the geopolitical structure of the region. These developments have been the subject of enormous analysis, but one very specific area remains largely outside the scope of discussion, namely the Islamic dimension of geopolitics.

Islam is now an integral part of the history and politics of the Middle East. Without taking into account what is commonly called the «Islamic factor», it is impossible to adequately assess the processes taking place here and to predict their development.

Let us try to look at the situation through this prism.

First and foremost, it must be said: Islam is an environment that produces a variety of different political concepts, theories, and practices. This religion serves as the basis for constant and very active creativity — socially, politically, and economically.

This creativity generates competition. At least three leading models vying for leadership within the Islamic Ummah can be identified: the Saudi, the Turkish, and the Iranian. (There is also an Asian model — Indonesian and Malaysian — but it has no direct bearing on what is happening in the Middle East).

Looking at the current crisis in the Middle East from the perspective of competing Islamic models, a fairly clear dynamic emerges: the Turkish model is outpacing its Saudi and Iranian rivals.

The Decline of Arab Islam: Desacralizing the Palestinian Question

The tragic events in Gaza and the reaction of the Arab monarchies to them have shown that the Palestinian issue has no significant Islamic dimension for the Arab elites. First of all, from the point of view of the Arabs — the founders of Islam — the most important holy places are Mecca and Medina, which are under the protection of the House of Al Saud. As for Palestine and its part — Jerusalem — they have no direct connection with Arabia, the cradle of Islam. Of course, the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem is the «first qibla» (the direction to which Muslims turn during prayer), but this holy place has its own guardian — the King of Jordan — and consequently the responsibility lies with him. Moreover, Jerusalem is a city of three religions; Islam cannot claim a monopoly here.

It seems that such an attitude toward Palestine created an atmosphere in which the «Abraham Accords» could be concluded, a kind of «spirit of Abraham» that appealed to the Arabs. With the signing of these Arab-Israeli «deals», the Palestinian issue became an obstacle on the way to normalizing relations with the Jewish state. Moreover, this obstacle was essentially created by their own brothers — the Arabs, with whom, according to the wealthy sheikhs, one can finally negotiate and bargain. The point is not to give the issue existential or religious significance. That is why the Arabs have oriented themselves towards cooperation with the secular Palestinian authorities, and certainly not with the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) and similar groups.

Meanwhile, for the competing Islamic models — those of Iran and Turkey — the Palestinian issue, far from being a «family matter», takes on a distinctly religious character. For Tehran and Ankara, the Palestinians’ struggle for their land is part of the struggle for Jerusalem, which is threatened by «Judaization», and for the preservation of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, on the site of which a new Jewish Temple in Jerusalem could be built. In other words, the issue is not Gaza as such, nor even the creation of a Palestinian state, but the inviolability of Muslim holy places. On this basis, the Turks and the Iranians have developed and pursued their own policies. For the Ummah, such an approach seems much more correct, while the «spirit of Abraham» reeks of apostasy.

The Erosion of Wahhabism

Among the reasons that have contributed to the decline of the Saudi model of Islam is the process of erosion of the originally extremely strict, hardline, «puritanical» values, rules, and teachings of traditional Wahhabi doctrine in Saudi Arabia. This process was set in motion by the reforms of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and today the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can hardly be considered a model of religiosity and morality.

The young crown prince’s reforms were an answer to the long-standing question of how Wahhabi Islam (and Islam in general) relates to the modernization of society and the economy, to the development of technologies, to the freedoms inherent in modern society, to the unlimited flow of information, and so on. Historical experience has shown that Wahhabism acts as a powerful brake on any progress, and it is not surprising that a representative of the new generation of the Arab elite has decided to correct this. However, it seems that by stripping Wahhabism of its traditional strictness, he has rendered it hollow, deprived it of character and specificity. As a result, Islam in the Kingdom (and even more so in the UAE) is rapidly turning into something akin to a Western-style «indigenous religious ritual» — devoid of sacred meaning and, consequently, of appeal and authority in the eyes of the global Ummah.

In these conditions, the factor of rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar becomes significant. It is not by chance that Doha acts on the regional stage as a partner of Tehran and Ankara, but not as an ally of Riyadh. The fact is that the Qatari ruling family, the Al Thanis, consider themselves the true heirs of Wahhabism and accuse the Saudis of illegally appropriating and distorting this doctrine. This detail is significant; it lies at the heart of the split between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which prevents the Arab monarchies from forming a united political and spiritual-religious front in the competitive struggle with their neighbors.

Against this backdrop, the Islamic models in Iran and Turkey look quite different. Both the Iranian and Turkish experiences demonstrate that Islam is compatible with institutions of representative democracy, freedom of expression, scientific and technological progress, and cultural modernization. Moreover, it is capable of retaining its character, not yielding to the pressures of modernity or conforming to the demands of «new trends», but rather reworking these innovations and integrating them into societies that are inherently Muslim.

Certainly, both the Iranian and the Turkish socio-political systems can be criticized from the standpoint of Western standards, but for the Ummah they appear much more democratic and fair than the Arab monarchies. But the most important fact is that the undeniable successes of the Turks and Iranians in the economy, in mastering advanced technologies, and in the military sphere — their ability to negotiate on equal terms with America, with the West in general, with China, and with Russia — all of this proves, in the eyes of the Ummah, that Islam is not a dead end (as it seemed a few decades ago). There are effective models of Islamic development, and Muslims are not condemned to live solely on oil as a «gift from the Almighty».

Iran’s Retreat

The unwillingness of the Arabs to get involved in the crisis that erupted in the Middle East after October 7, 2023, turned the region into a field for a strategic game between Turkey and Iran. In this context, Tehran took the most active part in the events — even exchanging blows with Israel. Turkey, on the other hand, concentrated on informational and political actions.

After the war in Gaza and its spread to Lebanon, followed by the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, it is clear that the Turkish strategy proved more productive. Iran has been forced to retreat. However, it seems that its retreat should not be misinterpreted as a defeat, let alone a defeat of the Iranian model of Islam.

On the contrary, throughout the Gaza war, Iran, through its direct participation, has managed to create an extremely striking and attractive image: the Shiite Persians as the only real support and hope for the Arab Sunnis in the Holy Land. This image erases the ethnic and sectarian boundaries that prevent the Ummah from uniting against the enemies of Islam and Muslims, and makes Iran and its Islamic model not only acceptable, but desirable.

However, this circumstance does not change the fact that «on the ground» Iran retreated, leaving Turkey victorious. And here is the fundamental point: Iran was unable to cross the line that separates its interstate, geopolitical conflict with Israel from a «holy war» in the name of defending Islam.

But Turkey was able to cross that line. Without essentially firing a single shot, it unleashed a real information war — not against the State of Israel, but in defense of Muslims against the «criminal Netanyahu gang». And it won this war by creating the image of an uncompromising defender of Muslims, a fighter for justice.

New Syria as Turkey’s Main Trump Card

However, the biggest victory was undoubtedly achieved by Turkey when the Assad regime fell in Damascus and power in the country passed into the hands of pro-Turkish Islamists. This event can be called historic without exaggeration, and here is why.

Turkey succeeded in bringing to power forces that are internationally recognized as terrorists (the «genealogy» of the Ash-Sharaa/Al-Julani group is well known). Of course, one can compare the situation with Afghanistan, where terrorists — the Taliban (a movement and terrorist organization banned in Russia) — also came to power. But unlike them, the Syrian HTS (Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham, a terrorist organization banned in Russia) did not enter the capital as a result of a long war, nor was it installed by some «behind-the-scenes» players. It openly acted as a puppet in the hands of Ankara.

The most important aspect is that Ankara has assumed the responsibility of legalizing the new Syrian authority. In other words, we can talk about the «re-education» of yesterday’s terrorists and their transformation into «normal» politicians and administrators. This is like «taming a dragon», an experiment that no one has ever tried before.

It seems that the Turks have been preparing for this in Idlib, where, under their control, there has been a «reforging» of ISIS militants (a terrorist organization banned in Russia) into bearers of the Turkish model of Islamic state-building. Now it can be expected that a showcase — a kind of “export version” of Turkish Islam — will be created in Syria.

But that is not all. If the experiment of «re-educating» Islamists in Syria succeeds, Turkey will not only regain the Syrian lands it lost as a result of World War I. It will prove that the Turkish model of Islam is capable of turning terrorists into «good guys», «proper» politicians. In other words, it will show that this model is acceptable under any conditions, including the most difficult ones, and that there are no insoluble problems for it in the modern world. And that in order to rid the Middle East, Asia and Africa of «Islamist» terrorist forces and groups that spread fear throughout the world, one must turn to Ankara. Only there will be answers to all questions, not in Riyadh and Tehran!

Turkey on the Road to the Caliphate

Within the logic presented above, the conclusion is fully justified: Turkey, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, not only aims to realize a neo-Ottoman project, but also to revive the caliphate.

Recall that the Ottoman Caliphate existed from 1517 to 1923 and was finally abolished in 1924. Since then, the Muslim Ummah has been without a universally recognized leader, without a legitimate successor to the founder of Islam — the Prophet Muhammad. To date, no Muslim ruler (legitimate or pretender) has been able to claim the title of caliph. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that President Erdoğan seeks to restore this great title to the rulers of Turkey, the heir of the Ottoman Empire.

In this context, Syria is not just a geopolitical acquisition or a springboard for further expansion. It is a step on the «great path» in the name of Islam. It is no coincidence that the slogan «Damascus is the gate to Jerusalem» has emerged. And this, in turn, may indicate that this holy city (Al-Quds) should be under Turkish rather than Jordanian (Hashemite, Arab) guardianship.

It must be remembered that the title of caliph is not acquired through power, wealth, or force. It is a reflection of the trust of the Ummah. Let us assume that in the modern world such trust can only be gained by being the protector of Muslims — from the «corrupting influence» of the West, from the threats of extremist and terrorist «deviations», from the aggression of the «enemies of Islam». And this is exactly the image that present-day Turkey is deliberately creating for itself.

And this image is being recognized in the Muslim world. For example, during his recent tour of Asia, President Erdoğan was hailed as the «leader of the global Muslim community» (in the words of Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim) and as the «great leader not only of Turkey but of the Islamic world» (in the words of Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif). It seems that these are not empty compliments, and now Erdoğan has even more reason to see himself as the true leader of the global Muslim Ummah.

Why This Is Important for Russia

Such an enhancement of Turkey’s role in the Islamic world is of the most immediate relevance to Russia’s external and internal interests.

First, this new status and Ankara’s special spiritual authority have the potential to extend into the post-Soviet space through the Organization of Turkic States, which includes Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The development of Islam in these countries along Turkish lines could significantly change the regional situation, including relations with Russia, with Russians, and with Orthodoxy. It would also affect relations with Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan.

Second, we can expect an increase in the influence of Turkish Islam in Russia’s Muslim regions.

In both cases, one must remember the Syrian experience of «re-educating» Islamist extremists and terrorists, which the Turks are likely to promote and propagate widely. How this will affect the situation will largely depend on how skillfully Russia can build relations with the new Turkey.

Finally, it must be taken into account that the increase in Turkey’s influence (both religious and otherwise) is bound to meet with resistance from Saudi Arabia and Iran. The rivalry between them may intensify and eventually encompass not only the post-Soviet space but also Russia.

Overall, this could have a destabilizing effect on the situation within Russia and along its borders in Central Asia and the Caucasus.