AP
France is determined to revisit the 1968 migration agreement with Algeria — now a matter of honor for the Minister of the Interior, who is prepared to put his job on the line
The prognosis for Franco-Algerian relations is bleak. The ‘patient’ is unlikely to survive — no amount of leech therapy will help. Formally, many attribute the onset of the deterioration in relations to the dispute between France and Algeria over the Western Sahara — a tiny territory in West Africa claimed by both Algeria and Morocco, with France siding with Morocco. In reality, however, relations had already begun to deteriorate during Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency.
What’s the problem now? Algeria recently refused to accept a notorious influencer — an Algerian national living in France who not only openly despises the country but also urges others to join his cause. Naturally, the French authorities tried to deport him to Algeria, but he was immediately sent back to France. This was followed by a list of sixty more such «fighters» operating in France and recruiting disenfranchised Arab youth under their extremist banners — again, Algeria refused to take them.
There are currently around 3,500 Algerians in French prisons — a fifth of all foreign inmates. Eventually they will have to be released, and France is hardly eager to keep them on its soil. But these are just ordinary criminals. Beyond them is a list of 25,000 people earmarked for deportation from France — 90 per cent of whom are considered by French intelligence to be either susceptible to radical Islamic ideology or simply a threat to public order.
Deporting them, however, proves nearly impossible in practice. France has long endured a host of troubles: terrorists have rammed trucks into crowds during firework celebrations, staged shootings in theaters, and set off bombs on city streets. The final straw came with the terror attack in Mulhouse, where a man shouting «Allahu Akbar» stabbed seven passersby, killing one. Remarkably, that same individual had already been ordered to leave France 14 times. It was clear that something had to change.
To understand the context: after the Algerian War of Independence ended in 1962, France signed the Évian Accords with Algeria. On one hand, France wanted to make amends for its colonial past; on the other, it was eager to bring in inexpensive Algerian labor to fuel its economic boom — workers for construction sites, hazardous industries, street-cleaning jobs, and so on.
Those accords were drafted in a rather cunning manner: they primarily granted rights to the so-called «pieds-noirs», French nationals who had either moved to Algeria or been born there.
I can’t resist a little digression: according to one theory, Algerians used the term «pieds-noirs» («black feet») to refer to French soldiers in black boots; another theory points to French winemakers who crushed dark grapes with their feet. Meanwhile, the Kabyles — tribes from northern Algeria, including the ancestors of football star Zinedine Zidane — traditionally herded camels and rarely ventured beyond their own territory. There was a saying among Kabyle women: «He’s as handsome as a Frenchman», although few had actually seen one. During the war of independence, rumours spread that French troops were on their way, and everyone rushed out of their homes to greet these supposedly «handsome men». They turned out to be the soon-to-be-famous Battalion of Senegalese Riflemen, recruited in Dakar and its suburbs.
By 1968, it had become clear that the Évian Accords were not working as General de Gaulle had intended. The pieds-noirs were making less use of the accord’s benefits than the indigenous Arab Algerians. As a result, officials decided that same year to create the current Franco-Algerian agreement, which revised the Évian Accords.
Under this new agreement, Algerians gain access to an expedited family-reunification process. Unlike immigrants from other countries, they are not obliged to fully assimilate into French society or even learn French. Algerian students — unlike other foreign students — were allowed to work. There is also a special French residency permit for Algerians that provides a direct path to citizenship, and the 10-year French residence permit can be revoked only by a court order. Meanwhile, an applicant’s status as a «commercial operator» (i.e., businessperson) is not investigated — no one checks the enterprise’s accounts. In effect, an Algerian can arrive on a tourist visa, register a business (for instance, as an auto-entrepreneur), and promptly invoke the terms of the 1968 agreement to obtain residency.
Regarding family reunification, it’s important to note that in Arab societies, the concept of «family» is interpreted far more broadly than in the West. A third cousin is family, as is the nephew of one’s third wife. Naturally, some people exploit this to bring large numbers of relatives to Europe. Consider the images of so-called «Syrian refugees», most of whom are young men. Their aim is to secure any legal status in Europe and then bring over their families. It’s not difficult to see the pattern.
Marry a French citizen, live together for a year, and you receive a 10-year residence permit. If your parents are French and you’re Algerian, hurry up and file for documentation. The agreement even formalizes the Arabic institution of kafala: anyone can adopt a child, and that child is deemed a family member — third cousins and all. In the standard French bureaucracy, this would be notoriously difficult to verify, but under the Franco-Algerian agreement, it’s straightforward. Some men have even managed to register three wives as «sisters».
In France, as in most countries, the Constitution is the highest law. Next come international treaties, followed by domestic legislation. Consequently, the 1968 agreement takes precedence over France’s internal laws. The outcome is that all Algerians — who account for about 40% of all migrants — can effectively bypass French laws in favor of the 1968 treaty.
Naturally, these figures are estimates, because it is illegal in France to conduct polls or gather public opinion data on the basis of nationality, race, and similar criteria. Nevertheless, sociologists carefully do their work, so the numbers are fairly accurate.
Algerians in France tend to have large families and rely on social benefits under the 1968 treaty. Their teenagers top the crime statistics and resent everything French, feeling like second-class citizens — despite the fact that nothing actually stops them from pursuing an education and becoming fully integrated, respectable French citizens. (For the record, I personally know many well-educated, intelligent young Algerians — friends of my children — who are entirely decent people.)
But these are exceptions. So where does that leave France? How can it handle both the surge in crime and terror attacks involving Algerians, and Algeria’s repeated refusal to accept its own problematic citizens?
As an initial move, the French Minister of the Interior announced the termination of an additional agreement that had granted visa-free privileges to Algerian diplomats. This decision affects 801 diplomatic passport holders. Does Algeria truly have that many diplomats? Most likely, they include members of the nomenklatura, business elites, and individuals who simply purchased these blue passports. Now they will be obliged to produce an overwhelming amount of paperwork for French visas — enough to challenge even the most seasoned French bureaucrats.
Passport control will be tightened at all Mediterranean ports — though this move might seem a bit absurd, given that people have long been jumping into the sea near the coastline and swimming ashore, a tried-and-true approach.
France also proposes stopping social and medical aid for Algerians whose relatives already live and work in the country. That measure sounds much more serious.
Another idea is to deploy tax inspectors against Algerian property owners on Avenue Foch in Paris, in the upscale suburb of Neuilly, and other prestigious areas across France. That alone would give those individuals pause.
Finally, the main goal is to revisit or even terminate the 1968 agreement itself. The Minister of the Interior has been calling for this, and Bruno Retailleau has championed the idea for some time — about six months now. However, under the French Constitution, only the President of the Republic can unilaterally take that step.
Emmanuel Macron might indeed consider it, if only because Retailleau (with these proposals) was moved from the short-lived Barnier government directly into Bayrou’s cabinet, without losing his position. Retailleau is a socialist, yet both of those governments were center-right with hardly any socialists at all. This suggests he was retained in a key role for a reason. Clearly, the Élysée Palace supports his ideas but prefers for the Interior Ministry to do the initial heavy lifting. Indeed, abrogating the treaty with Algeria has become the minister’s overriding mission.
Every week, the issue stirs controversy in the French Parliament and fuels public debate. Eventually, Retailleau declared that if the agreement is not revised, he — having weathered two different administrations — will simply step down. Not surprisingly, he enjoys solid backing from right-wing parties.