China strengthens its influence in Central Asia to counterbalance the United States.
The Chinese love symbolism. It is no coincidence that the China-Central Asia summit was organized by the Chinese leadership not in Beijing, but in the ancient Chinese capital of Xi'an, where the tomb of the great unifying emperor Qin Shi Huang is located and where the Silk Road originated from ancient times. It is also home to an unprecedented logistics center – the so-called "dry port" – where cargo flows from all over China for shipment all over the world, including Russia and Europe. President Xi Jinping invited his colleagues from the five Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan to visit him on the eve of the G-7 summit in Hiroshima.
Against the backdrop of the G7 discussion of what other lethal weapons to give Ukraine and how to annoy Russia, the conversation in Xi'an particularly contrasts with the agenda of the collective West. The China-Central Asia summit discussed the global prospect of creating a "community with a common destiny" and a common future in the region. President Xi, in fact, made this idea the main message of his keynote speech.
More specifically: the formation of mechanisms for radically increasing economic cooperation in the region and ensuring trade exchanges not only with the countries of the region, but also transit supplies. In Xi'an it was also announced the official creation of a mechanism for meetings between the head of China and the states of Central Asia. The Central Asian countries will take turns hosting the summit, which will be held every two years. The next such meeting will be held in Kazakhstan in 2025. China will have a permanent secretariat. The six countries also agreed to deepen cooperation in all areas, prioritizing transport, economy and trade, investment and production, agriculture, energy, customs and humanitarian exchanges.
As Chinese President Xi Jinping said in Xi'an, China and the Central Asian countries intend to firmly support each other in matters relating to their core interests, such as sovereignty, independence, security and territorial integrity. Beijing's $3.72 billion in non-reimbursable aid to the Central Asian countries is a tangible confirmation of these statements.
China has been Central Asia's largest trading partner for many years. Central Asian states export dozens of types of agricultural products to the PRC, including wheat, soybeans, dried fruits, fruits, beef and mutton. Over the past thirty years, trade between China and the five Central Asian countries has grown more than 100 times. In 2022, the figure was $70.2 billion, an all-time high. In the first three months of this year, trade turnover increased 22 percent year over year. In 2022, China's imports of goods from CA countries, such as agricultural products, energy and mineral products, increased by 50 percent, and exports of electromechanical products from China to CA countries increased by 42 percent. It should be noted that a certain share of this growth is also due to the supply of Chinese goods to Russia to circumvent sanctions. At the same time, Chinese participation in the region is not politically motivated and strikingly differs from the U.S. format of cooperation with the countries of the region, which has a pronounced anti-Russian and anti-Chinese orientation.
China is actively investing in Central Asian countries. As of the end of March 2023, China's direct investment in the five Central Asian countries exceeded $15 billion. Moreover, these investments are of a strategic nature, including strengthening the infrastructure of the region, which gives impetus to its further development. An example is the start in December 2022 of operation of 30 power units of 150 MW in the first stage of a wind power plant in the Akmola region of Kazakhstan, built with the financial and technological participation of Chinese companies. Once the wind power plant reaches its full capacity, it will annually produce about 600 million kWh of environmentally clean electricity, which will help save 190 thousand tons of standard fuel equivalent of standard coal and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 480 thousand tons.
In November 2021, the second phase of construction of the North-South Highway was completed in Kyrgyzstan, where the contractor was a Chinese company. The implementation of this project significantly improved transport conditions and also had significance for the socio-economic development of the region. The Angren-Pap railway with the longest tunnel in Central Asia, the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, the China-Central Asia gas pipeline, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan highway, the China-Uzbekistan Pensheng Industrial Park, the China-Tajikistan-Uzbekistan highway – this is only part of the list of infrastructure projects being implemented in Central Asia with Chinese assistance. Of course, we can say that China is doing this to facilitate its access to these countries, in its interests, including transit. But in general, no one is forbidden to use these facilities, especially Russia.
China's interest in the region is determined not only by geographical proximity and the development of mutual trade. Almost 80% of the routes of the China-Europe express trains (container trains running along the road connecting China and Europe) pass through Central Asia. By the end of 2022 the number of trains "China – Europe" exceeded 65 thousand. They transported more than 6 million containers with cargo worth $300 billion.
At present, 82 routes linking China with Europe via Central Asia have already been opened and are in operation. They connect the PRC and 200 cities in 24 European countries.
China has relevant agreements with all of the five Asian countries to integrate their development strategies and the One Belt, One Road project.
At the Xi'an summit, documents were signed to complement those already existing. We often hear voices arguing that China is subjugating these countries, which are in Russia's sphere of direct interest. At the same time, no one forbids Russia to implement its own projects. In addition, there is an agreement on pairing the OBOR with the Eurasian Economic Community. China is certainly interested in Russia's participation. And from our point of view, the fewer Americans in the region, the better. At a time when the countries of the region are trying to balance the presence of major powers so as not to fall into dependence, the "division of labor" between China and Russia looks quite organic: Russia provides strategic stability (the example of assistance to Kazakhstan in eliminating the color revolution is evidence of this), and China contributes to economic development. After all, China's GDP is ten times higher than Russia's. And China's economic opportunities are corresponding. But in terms of military and political influence, Russia still gives a head start to any regional player.
The priorities of Russia and China in Central Asia largely coincide. In their latest joint declaration, the two countries stressed their rejection of so-called "color revolutions" in neighboring regions and said they would oppose interference by outside forces in the internal affairs of sovereign countries.
And the summit in Xi'an showed that there are no contradictions here. Russia has its own format of communication with Central Asia. A summit similar to Xi'an was held with Russian participation in Astana in October 2022.